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University of California at Santa Barbara I extend the theoretical domain of sociology into an area of social psychology that heretofore has been the exclusive domain of psychologists. Specifically, I develop a social structural perspective on the choice shifts that individuals make within groups. During interpersonal discussions of issues, choice shifts occur when there is a difference between group members' mean final opinion and their mean initial opinion. Explanations of choice shifts have emphasized group-level conditions (e.g., a norm, a decision rule, a pool of persuasive arguments, a distribution of initial opinions). I argue that choice shifts are a ubiquitous product of the inequalities of interpersonal influence that emerge during discussions of issues. Hence, I bring choice shifts squarely into the domain of a structural social psychology that attends to the composition of networks of interpersonal influence and into broader sociological perspectives concerned with the formation of status structures.
he etiology of networks of interpersonal _ interaction and the effects of these networks on actors' agreements and decisions have been longstanding concerns of sociologists. There was a time when psychologists, following the lead of Kurt Lewin, also were active in studying the origins and effects of interpersonal networks (Cartwright and Zander 1968; Festinger, Schachter, and Back 1950; Newcomb 1961) . As an area of study within psychology, however, the field of group dynamics has declined, and although the concepts of group membership and group effects have been retained, psychologists now rarely grapple with the network structure of groups, the social processes that unfold in these networks, and the contributions of these network structures and processes to individual and collective outcomes. It is sociologists-concerned with the origins of influence networks and status structures, the effects of social exchange networks on actors' bargaining behavior, and the effects of social networks on information flows, consensus formation, and collective actionwho continue to grapple with these matters.
With few exceptions, however, sociologists have restricted their studies to questions that have not been pursued by psychologists (Cook, Fine, and House 1995; Lawler, Ridgeway, and Markovsky 1993) .
This "boundary" is strange and artificial be- In this article, I develop a social structural perspective on one of these questions-the explanation of choice shift and group polarization in small groups. The study of choice shift and group polarization is a prominent A choice shift is said to occur when, after a group's interaction on an issue, the mean final opinion of group members differs from the members' mean initial opinion. Group polarization is said to occur when the choice shift is in the same direction as the mean initial opinion (e.g., if on some issue, the initial attitude of the average member is positive [negative] , then the subsequent attitude of the average member after group discussion will be more positive [negative] ). An explanation of choice shift is fundamental because it would also explain group polarization.
Group polarization always involves a choice shift, but a choice shift can occur that does not entail group polarization (i.e., a choice shift that is in the opposite direction of the initial inclination of the group).1
Research on choice shifts originated with a finding about choice dilemmas (issues in which a level of acceptable risk on a course of action is being debated) that indicated that the decisions of groups involve higher levels of risk-taking than do the decisions of individuals (Stoner 1961) . This finding, known as the "risky shift," stimulated a huge number of studies. Recently, research on choice shifts has developed as a counterpoint to classical models of influence, which emphasized mechanisms of accommodation and conformity (Allport 1924; Asch 195 1; Festinger et al. 1950; Sherif 1936) . The assumption motivating this recent work is that the ubiquitous occurrence of choice shifts indicates a serious limitation of the classical models of social influence and demands the development of new theories based on different assumptions (McGarty et al. 1992; Turner and Oakes 1989) .
I develop an account of choice shifts that was suggested by Cartwright (1971) in his analysis of the "risky shift" literature. Cartwright pressed for an analysis of the individual-level process that produces a choice 1 Choice shift and group polarization have been defined and measured in different ways. I review these alternative approaches later in this article.
shift. He suggested that a choice shift could be produced by the process of interpersonal accommodation itself (i.e., that no new process or separate group effect produces these shifts), and he pointed to the formal theory of social power developed by French (1956) and Harary (1959) as a possible starting point for such an explanation. However, Cartwright stopped short of demonstrating that an "Ockham's razor" principle might be applied. Much of the subsequent work on choice shifts has continued to argue that a mechanism of social influence only predicts a convergence of opinion to the mean of initial opinions and, therefore, cannot account for the choice shift phenomenon.
I revisit Cartwright's (1971) arguments, applying a network theory of social influence I developed with Johnsen (Friedkin 1991 (Friedkin , 1998 Friedkin and Johnsen 1990, 1997) , which stems from the early work of French (1956) and Harary (1959) . This theory potentially has a broad range of applications to problems in collective behavior, organizational sociology, political sociology, and small group sociology (Marsden and Friedkin 1994) . I apply the theory to choice shifts and polarization in small groups and show how it can inform and integrate previous work on these phenomena. With this theory, I demonstrate (a) that choice shifts can arise simply from inequalities in the relative influence of persons in a group interaction, (b) that such inequalities are part of the process of interpersonal influence, and (c) that group polarization is not a ubiquitous, independent feature of the opinion formation process in group discussions of issues. In effect, I argue that a choice shift is the product of the group's social structure in which certain members have more influence than others during the opinion formation process.2
This theoretical approach encompasses, as a special case, the classical work on pressures toward uniformity which show that such 2 Thus, sociological work on status structures in small groups can have an important bearing on choice shifts (Berger, Fisek, et al. 1977; Berger, Ridgeway, et al. 1998; Ridgeway et al. 1998 ).
Status differentials foster unequal interpersonal influences that are a precondition of choice shifts.
I am not concerned with this mechanism here, although it suggests a theoretical link between work on status-organizing processes and choice shifts. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The many studies of choice shifts have discredited the idea that group discussion produces greater acceptance of risk. The more general phenomenon of choice shifts has been thoroughly documented, however, and continues to motivate research (Cartwright 1971 (Cartwright , 1973 Clark 1971; Dion, Baron, and Miller 1970; Isenberg 1986; Lamm and Myers 1978; Pruitt 1971; Vinokur 1971 ; also see the more recent work cited below). Currently, there are four main approaches to the study of choice shifts-social comparison theory, persuasive arguments theory, self-categorization theory, and social decision scheme theory. These approaches do not describe how the influence network of groups affects choice shifts, although they are consistent with the occurrence of this mechanism. I suggest that social influence network theory not only integrates important features of these approaches, but also provides a more concrete model of the social process by which choice shifts are produced via interpersonal influences.
Social Comparison Theory
According to social comparison theory (Baron et al. 1996; Goethals and Zanna 1979; Sanders and Baron 1977) , actors initially espouse opinions that are less extreme than their true opinions because of a fear of being labeled deviant and that (after group discussion reveals that others espouse similar but more extreme opinions) they shift their opinions toward their true values and may even leapfrog over the more extreme opinions of others:
This realization either "releases" the moderate members from their fear of appearing extreme, or motivates moderate members to "compete" with the extreme members to see who can come closest to espousing the most admired position. In either case, the moderates are motivated to adopt more extreme positions, while there is no corresponding pressure on extreme members to moderate their opinions (although, of course, simple conformity pressure may lead to some small amount of moderation by extreme members). The net result is an overall polarization of opinions, that is, a choice shift. (Sanders and Baron 1977:304) Group discussion, by exposing group members' opinions, erodes moderate opinions and reinforces the normative attraction of adopting extreme positions. This theory does not address any of Festinger's (1954) hypotheses about the effect of an opinion discrepancy on interpersonal influence, nor does it draw on the idea of a structure of interpersonal influences. Instead, the theory proposes a process of de-inhibition followed by status competition, which contributes to the development of opinions in a group-a process that is separate from the action of interpersonal influences on the reduction of opinion differences.
Persuasive Arguments Theory
Persuasive arguments theory (Burnstein 1982; Burnstein and Vinokur 1973, 1977) explains group polarization on the basis of the content of the arguments that arise during a discussion. The hypothesis is that there is a pool of arguments that could be applied to any issue, and that discussants draw those arguments from the pool which support their initial opinions. Hence, if the distribution of initial opinions is biased in a particular direction, the sample of arguments expressed will reflect this bias and thus will influence the direction of a choice shift:
When the preponderance of arguments in the pool favors a particular alternative, the average prior attitude reflects the direction and magnitude of this preponderance. Further thought or CHOICE SHIFT AND GROUP POLARIZATION 859 discussion leads to polarization toward the alternative that initially elicits more and/or better arguments. (Burnstein and Vinokur 1977:3 16) This argument has been refined in various ways (Lamm and Myers 1978) , but the key idea is that choice shift and group polarization depend on the actual or implicit arguments for positions that result from group discussions or a rethinking of the issue. This theory does not address the structure of interpersonal influences that is based on the particular arguments and responses of group members to these arguments. Instead, it emphasizes the effects of the set of arguments that emerge on an issue. Nevertheless, the theory is not inconsistent with an analysis of individual differences in the pattern of persuasive argumentation in a group.
Self-Categorization Theory
Self-categorization theory (Mackie 1986; McGarty et al. 1992; Turner 1985; Turner Hence, self-categorization theory permits the prototypical or normative opinion to be any position in the range of group members' initial opinions (e.g., a prototypical position could be the group's mean initial opinion or it could be one of the group's most extreme opinions depending on the out-group frame of reference).
Proponents of self-categorization theory argue that group members modify their opinions to reduce the discrepancy between their initial opinions and a group norm because they identify with the group norm and because they find members' opinions more or less persuasive depending on the extent to which they represent the group norm. Thus, Turner (1987) states, "the informational value of a response or its 'persuasiveness' is exactly equivalent to the degree that it is perceived to be exemplary of some in-group norm or consensus" (p. 154). The influence network of a group is specified completely by the distances between members' positions and the prototypical position.
Social Decision Schemes
Social decision scheme theory postulates that group decisions can be understood in terms of the initial distribution of opinions in the group and a decision scheme, or decision rule, that members use to obtain a decision (Davis 1973; Kerr 1981; Stasser, Kerr, and Davis 1989) . A decision scheme may be based on majority rule, the arithmetic mean of initial opinions, the median of initial opinions, the most extreme initial position, and so on (Laughlin 1980; Zuber, Crott, and Werner 1992) . Harary (1959) and DeGroot (1974) . While these initial formulations described the origins of group consensus, they did not explain influence processes that reduced opinion differences short of a consensus. Friedkin and Johnsen's (1990) work addressed this limitation (i.e., accounted for the emergence of settled patterns of disagreement in a group) and formally integrated this line of theory with extant sociological approaches to network effects (Burt 1982; Doreian 1981; Erbring and Young 1979; Friedkin 1990; Marsden and Friedkin 1994) .
The distinguishing characteristic of this theoretical approach is its attempt to model the flows of interpersonal influence that affect actors' opinions; compare the work on social decision schemes (Stasser et al. 1989) and social impact theory (Latane 1981) . converse with network members A and C.
Group members were instructed that they could communicate with other members of the group as frequently as they liked, but that they must communicate at least once with each person whose name was listed on their telephones.
Group members were given up to 20 minutes to discuss the assigned issue. Each group was instructed that attaining consensus was feasible and desirable:
Your goal is to reach consensus. If it seems difficult to reach consensus, remember that most groups are able to come to some decision if those who disagree will restate their reasons and if the problem is reread carefully.
Upon reaching group consensus or a deadlock, group members were asked to record their final opinions on the issue.
Each group dealt with five issues in sequence. To eliminate crossover effects, the order of the issues was systematically varied among the groups. Three discussion issues were choice dilemmas that appear in the "risky shift" literature: the "Sports,"
"School," and "Surgery" issues (described below). Two other issues involved making a judgment about an appropriate monetary reward: the "Asbestos" and "Disaster" issues (also described below). Individuals' opinions on these issues were represented by real numbers-subjective probabilities on the gests that the more conservative a group is initially, the more likely it is that the group will accept a greater degree of risk. For the Surgery issue in dyads and tetrads, however, the results are consistent with baseline assumptions. For the Sports issue in triads, the confidence limits for the intercept (-29.65, -.11) suggests that discussion tended to increase the average level of risk-taking in a group whereas in tetrads there is no such effect. Finally, for the School issue in dyads, the confidence limits for the intercept (3.28, 31.83) suggests that discussion tended to diminish risk-taking, and the limits for the slope (.58, .98) suggests that the more conservative a group is initially, the more likely it is that the group will accept a higher degree of risk. However, on the School issue in triads and tetrads, the results are consistent with baseline assumptions. In short, although there are choice shifts in these data, the shifts are not patterned in a systematic way among the groups addressing a particular issue.
Model 2 suggests that the network model provides a plausible explanation of how choice shifts are produced. Model 2 regresses the group's mean equilibrium opin- 6.33 .78, 4.02 .87, 1.51 .90, 1.15 .89, 16.56 .63, 9.44 .81, 81.73 .25, 26.30 .67, 15.12 .79, 11.56 .83, 1.05 .697 .864 50 Triads Surgery 3.03, 29.05 a .63, 8.63 .89, _.lla .91, 2.68 .94, .35 .99, .78 .98, 1.07 .828 .987 32 Dyads School 3.28, 31.83a .58, 98b 1.94, 22.32a .71, 18.58 .69, 11.88 .79, 1.05 .97, 2.21 .96, 1.22 .835 A potential weakness of the measure of the group's influence network is that it is based on information subjects provide after they have completed their discussion of an issue.
The influence network formed on one issue may carry over into the group's discussion of another issue, however, especially if the two issues do not involve substantially different types of expertise and interests. Table Table 3 as a byproduct of the group's influence structure and an outcome of the same process that sometimes produces convergence on the mean of the group's initial opinions. Third, the idea that pressures toward uniformity cause a group's opinions to converge to the mean of members' initial opinions should be replaced with a more general idea that such pressures cause a group's opinions to converge to a weighted average of members' initial opinions. Cartwright's (1971) analysis of the "risky shift" literature not only suggested that there was no reliable "risky shift" but also suggested a reconceptualization of "risky shifts." He suggested that the question was not "Why does group discussion produce riskier decisions?" but rather "Why does group discussion produce choice shifts?"
Although the field has moved to a broader conceptualization in which choice shifts are now the focus of study, research is still wedded to a paradigm in which some grouplevel condition (a norm, a decision rule, a pool of arguments, a distribution of initial opinions) determines group outcomes. My study suggests that choice shifts should be viewed as an aggregate manifestation of an influence process, and that the focus should not be on the choice shift itself (which derives from the influence process) but on the opinion changes that occur for each individual in the group. From this perspective, the crucial phenomenon is the network of interpersonal influence and the process by which these interpersonal influences modify actors' opinions. These findings support Cartwright's (1971) proposal that the formal theory of social power developed by French (1956) and Harary (1959) Clearly, a persuasive-arguments perspective on choice shifts is also consistent with an influence network approach. I suggest that the effects of persuasive arguments can be conceptualized at a dyadic level as a pattern of interpersonal influences. Knowing who is persuading whom should improve an account of the direction of a group's opinion changes. The cognitive processing perspective could be broadened to include a wider domain of effects on interpersonal influence. For example, individuals may shift their opinions toward the opinion of a person who has simply displayed an opinion if that person has power bases (French and Raven 1959) or status characteristics (Berger, Conner, and Fisek 1974) The aii computed from equation A-6 is a complex number for -4 < Ai < 0, greater than 1 for Ai < -4, and less than 1 for 0 < Ai. See Appendix Table A . But assumptions wij = 1 -aii and 0 < wii < 1 imply that 0 < aii < 1. Hence, for each real-valued Ai, the estimate of aii is selected to be the real number in the legitimate range [0, 1] that is numerically the
